Standard measures of multidimensional inequality (implicitly) assume common preferences for all individuals and, hence, are not sensitive to preference heterogeneity among the members of society. In this paper, we measure the inequality of the distribution of equivalent incomes, which is a preference-sensitive multidimensional well-being measure. To quantify the contribution of preference heterogeneity to well-being inequality, we use a decomposition method that calculates well-being inequality in different counterfactual distributions. We focus on four sources of well-being inequality: the correlation between outcomes and preferences, the preference heterogeneity, the correlation between the outcome dimensions, and the inequality within each of the outcome dimensions. We nd that preference heterogeneity accounts for a considerable part of overall well-being inequality in Russia for the period of 1995 to 2005.
Introduction
It is now widely accepted that a concern for inequality in society should go beyond an exclusive focus on the income distribution and should also consider the distribution of other dimensions that make life go well (see Stiglitz et al. (2009) ). This immediately raises the issue of how to aggregate the dierent life dimensions into a single measure of well-being inequality. Should one take individual preferences into account in this aggregation procedure? If one decides to use a preference-sensitive measure of multidimensional well-being inequality, how large is the contribution of preference heterogeneity to overall inequality?
The standard approach to multidimensional inequality measurement generalizes the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle to more dimensions and then directly imposes it in the multidimensional space of outcomes.
1 Although it is not always made explicit, most existing multidimensional inequality measures perform a two-step aggregation with one aggregation across dimensions and another across individuals. There are two possible sequences to perform these two aggregations and, in general, both sequences lead to dierent results (see Kolm (1977) , Dutta et al. (2003) and Decancq and Lugo (2012) ). In the rst sequence, one rst aggregates across the individuals in each dimension and then across the dimensions (see, e.g., Gajdos and Weymark (2005) ). From a normative point of view, this procedure has a crucial drawback. It does not capture the cumulative deprivation that occurs if the positions of the individuals across the dierent dimensions are correlated. This problem can be solved if one follows the second sequence, in which one rst aggregates the outcomes across the dimensions of well-being into a measure of well-being for each individual and then aggregates the well-being measures across individuals. However, the specication of the individual well-being measure that is used in the rst step is typically determined by axioms that are formulated over the entire aggregation process and does not necessarily relate to the literature on the measurement of individual well-being (see Decancq et al. (2015b) ).
A crucial question about these standard multidimensional inequality measures is whether they respect individual preferences over the life dimensions and their heterogeneity. In fact, it has been shown that they do not and even that they cannot. There is a deep conict between respecting the multidimensional PigouDalton transfer principle and respecting individual preferences (Fleurbaey and 1 See Weymark (2006) , Aaberge and Brandolini (2015) , and Chakravarty and Lugo (2016) for overviews of the literature on the measurement of multidimensional inequality.
2 Trannoy (2003) ). We briey explain the issue in Section 2. This impossibility result brings the literature to a crossroad. One route is to keep the multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and, consequently, to neglect individual preferences and their heterogeneity. This is the route taken by the standard approach to multidimensional inequality measurement. Alternatively, one takes preferences seriously and calculates the inequality in the distribution of a preference-sensitive well-being measure. This route leads to inequality measures that do not satisfy the multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, but a unidimensional transfer principle in the space of well-being measures. This is the route that we explore in this paper. As an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being we use the so-called equivalent income, which we also introduce in the second section.
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In the empirical part of this paper we rst measure the inequality in equivalent incomes in the Russian Federation between 1995 and 2005. To compute equivalent incomes and the inequality in their distribution, we estimate in Section 3 the -potentially heterogeneous -preferences of the respondents over their expenditures, health, housing quality, unemployment, and wage arrears on the basis of a life satisfaction equation.
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We are particularly interested in measuring the empirical relevance of preference heterogeneity on well-being inequality. In Section 4 -the core of the paper -we therefore construct various counterfactual distributions to decompose the inequality in equivalent incomes into four components: the correlation between outcomes and preferences, the preference heterogeneity, the correlation between the outcome dimensions, and the inequality within each of the outcome dimensions. We nd that, along with inequality in the expenditure and health dimension, preference heterogeneity accounts for a considerable part of well-being inequality.
Section 5 conrms the importance of preference heterogeneity through a decomposition of well-being inequality within and between population subgroups with the same preferences. Section 6 discusses how multidimensional dominance approaches relate to our measure of well-being inequality and how they tackle (or do not tackle) preference heterogeneity. In Section 7, we conclude and briey 2 Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) and Decancq et al. (2015a) discuss the axiomatic underpinnings of the equivalent income measure.
3 We use panel data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) between 1995 and 2005. This data set has also been used to compute equivalent incomes by Decancq et al. (2015a) . Compared to that paper, we include two additional periods in the analysis and use a more exible specication of the life satisfaction equation.
3 discuss the normative implications of our ndings.
2
Measuring well-being inequality and respecting preferences Let there be a society of n > 1 individuals. The outcome vector i = ( We assume that each person i has a well-behaved preference ordering R i over the set of her outcome vectors. We interpret these preferences as the wellconsidered judgements of the individual about what she considers a good life.
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The corresponding strict preference and indierence ordering are denoted P i and I i . We model the preference of each individual R i = R (a i ) as a function of a preference vector of k individual parameters a i = a We are interested in a measure of well-being inequality in the society I(L, A) that uses the outcome matrix L and the preference matrix A as its arguments.
We follow the so-called two-step procedure to measure well-being inequality. In the rst step of this approach, a well-being measure W B( i , a i ) is computed for each individual, and then in the second step a standard one-dimensional inequality index is applied to the well-being indices of the rst step: ( 1 , a 1 ) , . . . , W B ( n , a n )) .
(1)
The standard approach to multidimensional inequality measurement, on the contrary, neglects the information contained in the preference matrix A and uses a common well-being measure for all individuals, which depends on a vector of parameters a, but not on their individual preferences. It can therefore be written 4 As we know from the booming literature on behavioural economics, these well-considered judgements are not necessarily revealed in choice behaviour. 4 as I(L) = I(W B ( 1 , a) , . . . , W B( n , a)), (2) with dierent specic proposals corresponding to specic choices of I(·) and of the well-being measure W B(·, ·). 5 In the rest of this section, we rst explain why the simplication embodied in (2) is unavoidable if one wants to respect the multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, and then we introduce the equivalent income measure as one specic preference-sensitive proposal to measure well-being.
2.1
The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian A natural generalization of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle into a multidimensional framework is the following (see, e.g., Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) ):
, if for all individuals k = i, j we have that k = k and for individuals i and j we have that for
A situation is preferred to another situation if a positive bundle δ is transferred from a donor whose outcomes are at least as good in all dimensions of life as the receiver.
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The idea of respecting preferences and their heterogeneity can be expressed by the Weak Pareto Principle:
Weak Pareto Principle . (L , A) is strictly better than (L, A), if for all individuals i we have that i P (a i ) i .
The Weak Pareto Principle and the Multidimensional Pigou-Dalton Transfer
Principle conict as soon as at least two individuals have dierent preferences.
5 Maasoumi (1986) has proposed a two-step multidimensional generalized entropy inequality measure, for instance. Bosmans et al. (2015) interpret a normative two-step inequality measure as a measure of the social welfare loss due to the suboptimal distribution of outcomes after removing the social welfare loss due to its ineciency.
6 Let <, ≤, and denote the standard vector inequalities.
7 Lasso de la Vega et al. (2010) derive a class of multidimensional inequality measures consistent with this version of the Multidimensional Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle. However, in the axiomatic literature on multidimensional inequality it is more common to consider transfers where the transferred bundle is a fraction of the dierence between the outcome vectors of the donor and recipient of the transfer, and to drop the restriction that the outcomes of the donor should be at least as good as the outcomes of the recipient in all dimensions (see Weymark (2006) , for instance). These modications of the multidimensional Pigou-Dalton
Transfer Principle do not change the impossibility result discussed in this section, however.
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Figure 1: The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian Figure 1 illustrates this conict (see Fleurbaey and Trannoy (2003) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) (Kolm, 1977) . As a result, the well-being measures used to aggregate across dimensions must be identical for all individuals. This is the assumption that leads to the move from eq. (1) to eq. (2). Alternatively, if one wants to respect preferences and keep the more general framework of eq.
(1), one must choose a particular interpersonally-comparable representation of 6 the preference ordering R i for each individual as a well-being measure. We now turn to that issue.
Inequality in well-being: equivalent incomes
By denition, a well-being measure that respects individual preferences is a utility function that represents the preference ordering, i.e., it satises
In general, what we would like to capture with a preference-based well-being measure is the extent to which outcomes match individual preferences. Taking ) as the vector that contains the optimal value in the non-income dimensions for individual i. With heterogeneous preferences, these optimal values may be dierent for dierent individuals. If preferences with respect to life dimension j are monotonic, the optimal value is the highest possible value for that dimension. If individual i prefers to be as healthy as possible, for instance, then her optimal value will be equal to perfect health. For other life dimensions, however, the assumption of preference monotonicity may be less realistic.
Consider as an example the number of hours worked, where the optimal value may dier for a typical academic and a typical low-skilled blue-collar worker (Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) ). Now consider two individuals who both reach their own optimal outcome level in all non-income dimensions. Our basic assumption for making interpersonal well-being comparisons is that when comparing the well-being level of these two individuals we can restrict ourselves to comparing their incomes, independently of their actual preferences. Why should their preferences matter if they 7 reach their optimal outcome level in all non-income dimensions? As shown in Decancq et al. (2015a) , combining this assumption with respect for preferences characterizes the well-being ordering that compares individuals in terms of their equivalent incomes.
8 The equivalent income is formally dened as the solution 1 * i to the equation
In other words, it is the hypothetical level of income that, combined with the optimal outcome level in the non-income dimensions, keeps the individual on the indierence curve corresponding to her actual situation. If preferences are monotonic with respect to income, this equivalent income 1 * i cannot be larger than the actual income level 1
The equivalent income can be interpreted as the income corrected for the loss in well-being associated with a suboptimal outcome level for the non-income dimensions. This is an intuitively attractive way of capturing the idea of multidimensional deprivation, we believe. Moreover, it is conveniently measured in monetary units, which provides a simple and familiar cardinal scale. In the following, we measure well-being by means of equivalent incomes, i.e., we have
Once we have calculated an equivalent income for all individuals in society, we can implement eq. (1) using any unidimensional inequality measure. In our empirical application we will work with the Generalized Entropy class of inequality measures (see Cowell (2011) , and the references therein):
where µ is the average equivalent income
The lower the value of the parameter α, the more we focus on the bottom part of the distribution of well-being measures. We will concentrate on the mean logarithmic deviation (α = 0) and the Theil-index (α = 1) in this paper, because these inequality measures have attractive decomposability properties.
This approach obviously satises the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle in the space of well-being measures. Given the impossibility result discussed in the 8 We do not discuss the normative strengths and weaknesses of this proposal here, but we refer the interested reader to Decancq et al. (2015a,b) for a discussion. ranging from not at all satised to fully satised. We rst discuss the estimation of the life satisfaction equation and then briey explain how one can compute equivalent incomes on the basis of these estimates.
Estimation of the life satisfaction equation
Let us denote the latent variable underlying the life satisfaction responses of individual i in period t by S * it . We can then specify the life satisfaction equation as follows
9 No data were collected in 1997 and 1999. We allow for the non-linearity of the life satisfaction equation (and hence for less than perfect substitutability between the dimensions) through a so-called
Box-Cox transformation of the continuous dimensions j = 1, . . . , 3 (see Box and Cox (1964) ):
For the other two binary indicators, Γ j is the identify function so that these dimensions are not transformed. The scaling of life satisfaction in eq. (6) is allowed to be inuenced by a number of socio-demographic characteristics Z it (education, social status, and marital status) that are introduced together with time dummies γ t as control variables. Moreover, we include individual xed eects α i to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity in time-invariant characteristics including personality traits. To model preference heterogeneity we include interaction eects between the outcomes and four dummy variables contained in D it . These dummies capture whether the respondent is living in a rural area, is young (below the age of 33), is male and has obtained higher education. Finally, u it is a disturbance term.
The scalars β j and θ j , as well as the vectors µ j and δ, are coecients to be estimated. Since the observed life satisfaction responses are measured on an ordinal scale, we estimate an ordered logit model. We incorporate individual xed eects into the estimation using the approximation proposed by Jones 10 More detailed information on the construction of the data can be found in Decancq et al. The other columns in Table 1 
Computation of the equivalent incomes
Let the satisfaction function S it be the function that maps the outcome vectors and preference parameters to the response to the life satisfaction question by individual i in period t. These answers can be used to estimate preferences and compute equivalent incomes if they are consistent with the preferences of the respondents, i.e., if the following consistency assumption holds:
Under this consistency assumption, the life satisfaction function is one possible utility function that provides a representation of the preference ordering of individual i, just as for the equivalent income well-being measure. Equivalent incomes and the life satisfaction function have dierent ways of attaching a label to the indierence curves, however. In Decancq et al. (2015a) , we have argued that equivalent incomes are interpersonally comparable in a normatively attractive way, whereas the life satisfaction functions are not.
To compute equivalent incomes, we rst determine for each individual her optimal outcome level in the non-income dimensions 2 i , . . . ,
. The estimates presented in Table 1 lead to preferences which are monotonic with respect to all life dimensions, so that the optimal values will be the same maximal value for all respondents. To be precise, they are set at being in perfect health, having a high housing quality 11 , not being unemployed, and not suering from wage arrears.
11 To avoid the results from being overly sensitive to outliers, we select the 90th percentile value of the estimated housing values.
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Under the consistency assumption of eq. (7), we can use the denition of equivalent incomes given by eq. (4) and the econometric specication of the life satisfaction equation given by eq. (6) to write:
The shape of the indierence curves as measured by the marginal rate of substitution between the non-income dimensions and the income dimension (β 
Construction of counterfactual well-being distributions
The central idea of our approach is to compare the well-being inequality I(L, A)
in the sample with the inequality in dierent counterfactual well-being distributions that are constructed by neutralizing one or more sources of well-being inequality. As noted before, the matrix of preference parameters A contains the estimates of the interaction coecients from the life satisfaction equation.
Given that vector D it contains four dummy variables, we only have 16 dierent preference groups, and the preference matrix A contains a large number of identical rows. We construct the following four counterfactual matrices for each considered period:
Reshued preference matrix A. The matrix A is a permuted version of the preference matrix A, i.e., A=P · A, where P is an (n × n) permutation matrix. This operation reshues entire vectors of preference parameters a i across individuals. Each individual is randomly assigned a new preference vector from the sample. Clearly, the resulting preference matrix A is not unique. In our empirical application, we will therefore generate 200 of these permutation matrices and then provide information about the resulting distribution of the inequality measures.
Equalized preference matrix A. The matrix A is an averaged version of A,
i.e., A=Q · A for Q the (n × n) bistochastic matrix with 1/n in each cell. Note that the resulting preference ordering R(a) is in some sense articial, since it is obtained by averaging the preference parameters and it does not necessarily occur in the sample.
Reshued outcome matrix L. The matrix L is a (dimension-wise) permutation of the outcome matrix L. Each dimension is obtained by For each counterfactual matrix, reshuing neutralizes the correlation and averaging neutralizes the heterogeneity. With these counterfactual matrices as building blocks, we can construct the rst decomposition of well-being inequality, which we will call the preferences-rst decomposition:
Note that we provide a full decomposition with I(L, A) = 0. While it is natural to rst neutralize the correlation by reshuing and then to neutralize inequality by taking averages, there is no a priori reason to start by considering the preference matrix A rst rather than the outcome matrix L. We will therefore also consider an alternative decomposition of well-being inequality, which we will call the outcomes-rst decomposition:
+ (I(L, A) − I(L, A)) .
pref erence heterogeneity
Note that in the outcomes-rst decomposition we have that I(L, A) = I(L, A)
by construction. When all individuals have the same outcome vector, permuting the preference vectors does not aect inequality. So, in the outcomes-rst decomposition there is no eect of the correlation between outcomes and preferences on well-being inequality.
As is common with this type of decomposition, the results are path-dependent.
Therefore, the results of the preferences-rst and outcomes-rst decompositions will be dierent. Yet, we do not consider this path-dependence problematic since our aim is not to obtain a unique decomposition, but rather to understand the contribution of the dierent components and the interactions between them.
Combining the results from both decompositions will therefore yield useful additional insights.
Empirical results
Based on the preference estimates in Table 1, we can 
Correlation between outcomes and preferences
We look rst at the eect of the correlation between outcomes and preferences on well-being inequality. This eect can be measured by looking at the rst term in the preferences-rst decomposition given by eq. (9). This term quanties the dierence between the well-being inequality, computed using the actual outcome 
inequality indices that are each computed with a dierent reshued preference matrix A. Similarly, the light grey area shows the 99% condence interval. 13
The gures show that neutralizing the correlation between the outcomes and preferences lowers well-being inequality. This inequality-reducing eect of the correlation between outcomes and preferences can be understood by consulting Table 2 , which, for each non-income dimension of life (j = 2, . . . , 5), shows the Spearman rank correlation coecient between the outcomes j it and the individual-specic marginal rates of substitution between that dimension and the income dimension (β
. This marginal rate of substitution measures the willingness-to-pay for a small improvement in dimension j. Individuals who care more about their outcomes in the non-income dimension (or less about their income) have larger marginal rates of substitution and steeper indierence curves. The rank correlation coecients for the housing dimension in Table 2 are negative, for instance. Individuals who live in a relatively low quality house and are further away from their own optimal outcome level suer relatively more from this hardship. The dierence between the equivalent income 1 * i and the actual income 1 i is the loss in well-being of not reaching the optimal outcome level; hence the negative correlations for the housing dimension further increase the dierence between the well-being of those individuals who do better and those who do worse on that dimension. This nding presents a rst indication that it may be worthwhile to take preference heterogeneity into account when measuring well-being inequality.
Preference heterogeneity
We now turn to the second term of the decomposition, which neutralizes the preference heterogeneity by constructing a counterfactual distribution with the averaged preference matrix A. 14 An alternative approach would have been to use the coecients of Model 2 in Table 1 , which is estimated without interaction terms and in which preference dierences also have The results are striking. Removing preference heterogeneity leads to a substantial decrease in well-being inequality. The eect of substituting the averaged preference matrix A for the reshued matrix A is larger than that of substituting the reshued matrix A for the actual matrix A.
We make two further observations. First, the contribution of preference heterogeneity to well-being inequality remains quite stable over time. This is not surprising since we have assumed that preferences are constant over time for each person. Second, the contribution of preferences is relatively larger for GE 0 than for GE 1 . 15 One possible interpretation is that individuals at the top of the well-being distribution score well on their non-income dimensions, so there is only limited room for preference heterogeneity to aect their well-being. For individuals at the bottom of the well-being distribution, on the contrary, the relative weighting of their dierent (larger) deprivations is more important.
The empirical relevance of preference heterogeneity on well-being inequality as well as the dierences with the standard multidimensional inequality measures are further illustrated by the results of the outcomes-rst decomposition given by eq. (10). The two bottom curves in Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution over time of I(L, A) (which is equal to I(L, A)) and I(L, A) (which equals 0). The former counterfactual captures inequality in the situation where all individuals have the same averaged outcomes, but their own preferences. According to the standard approach, which only uses information about L, this inequality is necessarily equal to zero. As we discussed in section 2.2, however, there may be inequality in well-being, even with identical outcomes, as soon as we introduce a concern for preference heterogeneity. In fact, the gures show that this inequality is substantial in our data. We return to the normative implications of this nding in the conclusion.
15 Additional calculations, which are not shown here, conrm the pattern that preference heterogeneity has a larger eect as the inequality measure becomes more sensitive to the bottom of the well-being distribution. 
Correlation between outcomes
As described in the introduction, the phenomenon of cumulative deprivation, i.e., the correlation between the outcomes, has played a prominent role in the discussion on multidimensional inequality measurement (see Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) , Dardanoni (1996) , and Tsui (1999) , for instance).
In Table 3 , we present the Spearman rank correlation coecients between each pair of dimensions for 1995, 2000, and 2005 . In line with the ndings of Decancq (2014), we see an increased rank correlation between the expenditure and health dimension. Individuals who are top-ranked in the expenditures distribution become more likely to also be top-ranked in the health distribution over the considered period in Russia. Overall, however, the pattern of the correlation coecients is mixed.
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The contribution of the correlation between the outcome dimensions to wellbeing inequality can be seen in both decompositions. In the preferences-rst decomposition of eq. (9) 16 The impact that the increasing correlation between outcomes has on well-being inequality is an empirical matter because it depends on the interplay between the degree of substitutability and inequality aversion in both aggregation steps (see, e.g., Dardanoni (1996 ), Bourguignon (1999 , and Bosmans et al. (2015) for discussions).
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been removed, whereas the latter takes preference heterogeneity into account.
The results are shown in Figures 2 through 5 , where the dark grey area around the curves for I( L, A) and I( L, A) shows the 95% condence interval of the reshuing variance originating from the 200 reshued outcomes matrices L.
The light grey area shows the 99% condence interval.
We see that the correlation between the outcome dimensions increases wellbeing inequality and that the contribution increases over time. Moreover, the contribution of the correlation between the outcomes has a stronger eect in the outcomes-rst decomposition when the preference heterogeneity has not yet been neutralized. The increase in well-being inequality in the tumultuous period between 1998 and 2000 seems to be largely driven by the contribution of the correlation between the outcomes. As can be seen from Figure 4 , a counterfactual situation with a stable contribution of correlation over time would have led to a decrease rather than an increase in well-being inequality.
Inequality in outcomes
Let us nally look at the fourth term of the decomposition, which captures the contribution of the inequality in each of the outcome dimensions to overall well-being inequality. Again, the results for the preferences-rst decomposition (Figures 2 and 3 ) are related to the results of the standard approach to multidimensional inequality (since the preference parameters are xed for each individual at a).
We neutralize the inequality in the dierent dimensions in a specic order: rst we average expenditures, followed by, consecutively health, housing quality, unemployment, and wage arrears. In principle, this specic sequence may aect the results and other sequences may lead to dierent results. Yet, since the equivalent income well-being measure as dened by (8) is close to being additively separable, this eect is quite small, and reversing the sequence hardly changes the results.
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Our ndings are similar in the four gures.
18 Overall, the most important contributors to overall well-being inequality are the inequality in the expenditure and health dimensions. Moreover, there is a remarkable increase in well-being 17 Results are available from the authors on request.
18 Since the non-averaged dimensions have been reshued in the previous step of the decomposition, the non-uniqueness of the reshuing remains to cause some variance in the counterfactual inequality measures. The more dimensions that are averaged, however, the smaller this variance becomes.
26 inequality due to the presence of wage arrears around 1996. The eect of wage arrears tapers o over time, however.
Subgroup decomposition by preference groups
An alternative approach to investigate the importance of preference heterogeneity on well-being inequality is based on a classic between-within subgroup decomposition (see Cowell (2011) ). We partition the sample into 16 preference subgroups that are based on the socio-demographic characteristics captured by the four dummies in D it , i.e., the gender of the respondents, whether they have obtained some higher education, whether they live in a rural area, and whether they are young or not.
Following Cowell and Jenkins (1995) , we look at the subgroup decomposition to understand the importance of this particular partitioning in preference groups for well-being inequality.
We do that separately for I(L, A), I(L, A), and I(L, A). The mean logarithmic deviation (GE 0 ) and the Theil-index (GE 1 ), on which we have focused so far, have attractive decomposition properties. It is indeed well-known that GE α can be additively decomposed in a within component GE W α and a between component GE
where the between component is computed by setting all equivalent incomes in each preference group equal to their group average, and the within component is given by
with L k and A k being the outcome matrix and preference matrix for preference subgroup k = 1, . . . , K, v k = n k /n being the population share and s k the equivalent income share. When α = 0 the inequality within the preference groups is weighted by the population shares, whereas for α = 1, the equivalent income shares are used.
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19 In our data set, the equivalent income shares of the preference groups are more unequal compared to the population shares. Young, urban respondents have a larger equivalent income share and lower educated, rural respondents a lower equivalent income share compared to their population share.
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GE 0 (L, A) Additional insights can be obtained by looking at the decomposition of I(L, A).
Since all preferences are equalized in this counterfactual distribution, the between component only reects dierences in outcomes between the preference groups.
The between component is now much smaller, suggesting that preference heterogeneity is an important contributor to the dierences between the preference groups. As can be seen from comparing both tables, the within-group inequality is larger for the mean logarithmic deviation when with, rather than without,
, while the opposite is true with the Theil-index, i.e., GE
. This is in line with our earlier nding that taking preference heterogeneity into account has a larger eect for inequality measures that focus more on the bottom of the well-being distribution. Tables 4 and 5 The dominance approach and preference heterogeneity When computing multidimensional inequality with a common well-being measure W B( i , a), the results will depend on the specic choice of the common preference vector a. The dominance approach addresses this dependence by taking an agnostic position on the precise shape of the common preferences and by computing the results for classes of well-being measures that are characterized by restrictions on their cross-derivatives with respect to the outcomes (see Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) and Trannoy (2006) ). To some extent, this agnosticism moves us away from the perfectionism that is implicitly underlying the choice of a single well-being measure for all individuals. It comes at a price, however. The resulting well-being inequality ranking may turn out to be incomplete, meaning that some comparisons will be indecisive.
To illustrate, we implement the following well-being inequality ranking 21 :
where A is the set of all preference matrices in which all individuals share a common preference vector a that is observed in the sample. As we have seen in the previous section, there are 16 dierent preference groups in our 21 A similar approach underlies sensitivity analyses, such as, for instance, the one by Maasoumi and Jeong (1985) . Table 6 : Dominance test. A 1 means that the row year has a lower GE 0 than the column year for all observed preference parameters.
empirical analysis and, hence, 16 dierent preference matrices A. Clearly, this dominance idea could be further generalized by checking the inequality in eq.
(11) for various members of some class of inequality measures -by testing Lorenz dominance, for instance. However, testing dominance is not the purpose of this paper and we only illustrate the approach for a single measure, which is the mean logarithmic deviation GE 0 . Table 6 presents the results for all pairwise year-by-year tests of the dominance test given by eq. (11). A cell with a 1 denotes that the row year has a lower well-being inequality according to GE 0 for each of the 16 common preference matrices A. We see that all years are less unequal than 1996, and that most of the years after 2000 are less unequal than 2000.
It is important to stress that the dominance approach does not take into account the diversity in preferences in a given society at a given point in time. There is an important dierence between, on the one hand, looking for a unanimous inequality ranking for dierent well-being measures, each of them common to all individuals in society, and on the other hand measuring well-being inequality while respecting preference heterogeneity.
Although one has to interpret our ndings cautiously, this dierence can be illustrated by comparing the results in Table 6 with those in Figures 2 and 4 .
According to both approaches we nd that 1996 is more unequal than 1995 (and more unequal than 1998). Yet, while 2000 was more unequal than 1998 based on the gures, this is not found in the dominance results. This dierence may 30 have to do with the underlying causes of the increases in well-being inequality.
The increase in well-being inequality in 1996 is due to the sharp well-being loss as a result of the presence of wage arrears, which is an objective phenomenon that aects the inequality for all preference matrices A. The increase in 2000, however, is mainly due to an increase in the eect of the correlation between outcomes, and the correlation between outcomes and preferences. Preference dierences are important for the evaluation of the former correlation and essential for the latter correlations. This may explain why the sharp inequality increase in 2000 is not reected in the dominance results.
Conclusion
We have shown that preference heterogeneity constituted an important part of well-being inequality in Russia between 1995 and 2005. All-in-all, we have found that the main drivers of well-being inequality in the considered period were preference heterogeneity, expenditure inequality, health inequality, and wage arrears inequality (during the late 90s).
Some caveats apply, however. First, our empirical ndings are based on one data set only. In the period between 1995 and 2005, Russia was a specic setting, characterized by large social and economic changes in a heterogeneous society.
It is not clear whether preference heterogeneity would be equally important in other settings. Second, our method to estimate preferences on the basis of a satisfaction equation is arguably rather primitive. In particular, the consistency condition in eq. (7) is debatable and is hard to test empirically. Yet, one could argue that the fact that we cannot identify individual preferences with this method, but have to limit ourselves to only 16 dierent preference groups, strengthens our conclusion on the empirical relevance of preference heterogeneity.
More important than our specic ndings for Russia, however, are the normative and methodological questions that are raised by these ndings. Preference heterogeneity is completely neglected by the standard approach to multidimensional inequality measurement. Leaving pragmatic considerations of the availability of preference information aside, this position has been justied on normative grounds. There seems to be a certain distrust of individual preferences in the capability approach, for instance (Sen, 1985) . The capability approach has been very inuential in shaping the multidimensional approach towards the 31 measurement of well-being, inequality, and poverty. Already before Sen (1985) , Kolm (1977) suggested in his seminal article that a common well-being measure could be seen as the observer's evaluation of the individual welfare, and Scanlon (1975) wrote that the common objective opinion on what a good life is and what constitutes well-being is rooted in some reasoned social agreement on basic components of well-being and on the relative`urgency' of claims to dierent goods. As we have seen, the dominance approach does not depart from the basic idea that there is one underlying common well-being measure, but introduces the additional twist that there may be uncertainty about this reasoned social agreement or a lack of consensus between dierent ethical observers.
As emphasized by preferentialists, the argumentation in favour of neglecting individual preferences has a strong perfectionist avour. They claim that in a pluralist society with widely divergent opinions about what constitutes a good life, public policy in general, and inequality measurement in particular, cannot neglect these divergences and should therefore take up preference heterogeneity.
The dierence between the two approaches is perhaps illustrated most strikingly by their evaluation of the hypothetical situation in which all individuals in society have the same objective outcomes. According to the standard multidimensional measurement literature, no ethically relevant inequality remains in that situation. If one takes preferences into account, however, the match between the outcomes and the preferences is brought into the picture, and it is seen as ethically relevant that dierent individuals can attach dierent weights to the dierent dimensions and may therefore have a dierent well-being, even when their objective outcomes are the same.
Multidimensional inequality measures and dominance approaches are arguably the best way to proceed if one believes that individuals do not have well-dened conceptions of the good life, or that, even when they exist, it is impossible to know them, or that, even when they exist and one can approximate them, one should not do so, but rather implement an objective conception of the good life (Decancq et al. (2015b) approximated, and that they should be respected in a pluralist society, then one should introduce preference heterogeneity into the measurement of wellbeing inequality. This is essentially a normative debate, to which we did not contribute in this paper. What we have shown, however, are the stakes of the 32 debate. The normative choices determining the role of preference heterogeneity have a crucial eect on the resulting well-being inequality. They do matter.
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